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REFLECTIONS AND REPORTS
Powerlessness Grows Out of 
the Barrel of a Gun
Vijay Prashad
I heard about 9/11 from my sister-in-law, who called and said that something terri-
ble had just happened. Without cable television and with only intermittent Web gaz-
ing during the morning, I may have spent the day in beautiful Northampton, Mass-
achusetts, oblivious to the clash of fundamentalisms, to another episode of McJihad.1
But the contradictions intervened, and I sat down and wrote a brief piece called
“Nothing Good Comes from Terror.”
The short note, which went out on the Internet from ZNET that evening,
ended with the following words: 
The attacks must be condemned without reservation. But we must be certain to
recognize that these are probably the work of frustrated and alienated human
beings hemmed in by forces that are anonymous and that could only be
embodied by these structures. The people who work in them became the
“collateral damage” that we hear so much about when our cruise missiles strike
the Third World. Those who died are martyrs of this government’s insane
policies, as well as martyrs of the insanity of neoliberal globalization.
Even as I typed those words, I was thinking of one of my favorite figures from
our past, the great Bhagat Singh.2 Born in 1907 to a prosperous family in Lyallpur,
western Punjab, Bhagat Singh was swept up in the anticolonial fervor of his days.
Inspired by his freedom fighter uncle, Sardar Ajit Singh, Bhagat Singh joined his fel-
low students as they threw their bodies on the line to force British imperialism to
12-Prashad.cs  11/19/02  4:01 PM  Page 124
flee the subcontinent. When Punjabi revolutionary peasants formed the Ghadar
Party in San Francisco in 1913, they sent a message across the subcontinental dias-
pora that the masses of Indians were ready to be organized for militant action. The
voluble Congress Party (formed in 1885) had not done its duty, and it was in the dias-
pora—in the United States with the Ghadarites and in South Africa with the min-
ers and cane workers mobilized alongside M. K. Gandhi—that the fiery spirit of
mass organization of Indians took hold. The Ghadarites and Gandhi imported this
spirit back into the subcontinent and seized the patriotic energy of people like
Bhagat Singh.
In September 1928, Bhagat Singh, only twenty-one and already a veteran mil-
itant, became the secretary of the Hindustan Socialist Republican Association
(HSRA) whose goal was nothing less than the creation of a socialist republic of India.
The next month, the liberal wing of British imperialism sent the Simon Commission
to condescendingly ascertain the views of the people, so the HSRA decided to boy-
cott it, but also to protest its presence. At a major demonstration joined by patriotic
forces of all kinds in Lahore, Punjab, on October 30, 1928, the imperialist police
smashed the protesters and killed the Lion of Punjab, Lala Lajpat Rai, who had just
returned to India from his sojourn in New York City. Vengeance for this murder
came when Bhagat Singh and his group assassinated an important police official,
John Poyantz Saunders, in late 1928. Then, the next year, as the British government
tried to curtail civil liberties and workers’ rights through legislative action, the HSRA
decided to conduct a terrorist act on the legislature. On April 8, as the president of
the legislature announced that the bills against civil action had been passed, Bhagat
Singh and Batukeshwar Dutt threw one bomb each and countless leaflets into the
well of the chamber; loud noises, they wrote in a leaflet, are needed to make the deaf
hear their cries. The police arrested Bhagat Singh, sentenced him to die, and finally
executed him on March 23, 1931.
A young man born in the midst of desperate oppression, turned, like many
in his generation, to an impatient strategy to resolve the nation’s problems. In
December 1928, Bhagat Singh met the veteran Ghadar Party member and later
communist leader Sohan Singh Josh. Josh worried that Bhagat Singh’s group would
go the way of many small bands of militant young people, men and women alike,
who tried to take on the British Empire with their homemade weaponry and their
blind faith in a Sorelian kind of violence. In 1902, Bengali revolutionaries formed the
Anushilan Samiti; by 1907, the Marathis moved to terrorism through the Abhinava
Bharat group; and in the next year, radicals in Tuticorin, Tamil Nadu, conducted acts
of terror against symbols of British rule. The HSRA in Punjab brought this spirit of
terror to bear in the province from where the British continued to recruit their
global imperialist army, and to draw immense amounts of grain from the productive
soil and the toil of the peasantry. The historical record contains powerful symbols
from this period, such as the last words of the executed Kartar Singh Sarabha (who
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organized a mutiny among the Punjabi troops in 1915): “If I had to live more lives
than one, I would sacrifice each of them for my country’s sake.” Or else those of
Abdullah (a rebel soldier who refused to betray his non-Muslim comrades in 1915),
“It is with these men alone that the gates of heaven shall open to me.”3 The bands
of terror provoked the British to offer a fierce response, now justified by the acts of
violence conducted by the young patriots. In March 1915, the Defense of India Act
enabled the British to arrest hundreds of militants, hold them without habeas cor-
pus, and execute the most dangerous to the empire. Such laws and ordinances litter
the history of India from that day until the departure of the British, and onward.
If the Congress Party remained an elitist force because it did not go among
the masses until Gandhi returned to India in 1915, the terrorists suffered from the
same problem: they claimed to speak for a people whom they did not seek to orga-
nize. Josh pointed this out to Bhagat Singh, who replied that “we entirely agree with
the programme and activities of your party, but there are times when the blow to the
enemy has to be immediately counteracted by armed actions to inspire confidence
among the masses.”4 Josh had an easy rejoinder, a long 1924 article published by the
Communist Party of India (CPI) from its exiled offices in Central Asia. Keep in mind
that Gandhi, then already on the front page of the Indian movement, did not have a
lock on nonviolence, for although he fashioned it into a unique and important theory
of political work, the idea of nonviolent action has a long tradition on the left (strikes,
marches, civil disobedience, etc.):
No less futile is sporadic terrorism carried on by secret societies. Those who
resort to the futility of this extremism possess an equally wrong conception of
revolution. Violence is not a personal essential attribute of revolution. Under the
present state of society, political and social revolutions can hardly be expected
to be bloodless and nonviolent, but everything bloody and violent is not
revolutionary. A particular social system or political institution can never be
overthrown by assassinating individuals upholding them. It is no more possible
to win national independence by killing a number of officials than by a series of
reform acts passed by the British parliament. One method is as impotent as the
other, because none of them strikes at the root of the evil. Both are political
blunders.5
The refusal of random violence marked the communist movement, even as the
police and propaganda forces pronounced otherwise. In Capital, Marx wrote, “Force
is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one. It is itself an economic
power.” Where the social relations of capital had attained maturity, however, “the
dull compulsion of economic relations completes the subjection of the laborer to the
capitalist. Direct force, outside economic conditions, is of course still used, but only
exceptionally.”6
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The history of the subjugation of the oil lands is, certainly, a history of vio-
lence and suffering, of enforced poverty and illiteracy—especially in that condition
called the tolerance of Arabia. Power (that is, oil) does grow out of the barrel of a
gun, and indeed, the gendarme of the oil barons continues to hold onto that power
with violence, or the threat of it. Nevertheless, domination in capitalist conditions
occurs through the mediation of the economy, through the price of oil, for instance,
or else through the stark conditions of production in Arabia that enabled petrodol-
lars to be recycled through the U.S. economy, thereby re-creating the United States
as the buyer of last resort without too many gunshots.7 Such abstract domination
confounds the rebels, accustomed as they are to rush the baron’s castle or the money-
lender’s books, to confront a target that is more than the administrator of oppression.
The response to this immanent violence, the CPI suggested, is not necessar-
ily violence itself, for several related reasons. Even by 1924, the level of repressive
technology and military might was such that a generally disarmed population could
not pursue a frontal attack on the colonial state. Any armed action, therefore, comes
in two forms: first, as sporadic violence against individuals who stand in as repre-
sentatives of abstract domination, but whose own level of culpability is hard to
fathom; and second, as guerrilla warfare, attempts to whittle away at state power
and, by acts of élan, to appeal to others to join the struggle. Both fail to conduct the
three tasks so central to the left movement: to organize people into the struggle, to
proclaim one’s aims openly, and to overthrow the social relations not just after a coup
d’état, but also even as the struggle proceeds. The left today pays little attention to
the debates between Lenin and Bernstein (via Kautsky),8 but it may help us sharpen
our sense of what the left movement understands by smash (from Marx, Sprengung,
or explosion), as in “to smash the state.” Bernstein favored a gradual move to social-
ism by the reform of the capitalist structure, by the transformation of advanced cap-
italism into a socialism managed by a state form generally left untouched by the
reform process except that it is benevolent rather than malevolent. Better leaders, in
other words, can make the state act on behalf of the people. The problem concerns
those who are in power and not the configuration of state power that saturates the
habits and policies of the state to act at the behest of certain classes.9
Lenin, in response, felt that that capitalist state form itself acted to oppress
people, and that it was that state form that needed to be shattered or smashed. The
distinction is over what to do with the state form, and from that springs the strate-
gic and tactical difference between social democracy and communism. The latter
does not ask that the movement kill bureaucrats in a saturnalia of violence. The task
of radicalism is to “smash the old bureaucratic machine at once and to begin imme-
diately to construct a new one that will make possible the gradual abolition of all
bureaucracy—this is not utopia, this is the experience of the [Paris] Commune, this
is the direct and immediate task of the revolutionary proletariat.”10 There is no call
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to indiscriminate violence, but there is a call to radically transform the way in which
power operates in society.
While the left is not prone to violence, left organizations and intellectuals do
tend to valorize the acts of armed resistance from the working class and peasantry,
deeds that come at tremendous cost to those who take to the gun or sword only when
imperialist oppression becomes unbearable. We do write paeans to peasant rebel-
lions, but mainly because we want to put on record the enormous courage it took for
the masses to break down the walls of agrarian privilege, even as we may in a
humanist fashion want to recognize the tenacity of the human spirit lodged in the
hearts of the exploited classes. But it is not only the history of the fight that is wor-
thy of respect, for the left does tend to sanction acts of violence against the property
of oppression to put on record the frustrations of the people, as well as to inflict pain
on property for its violence against everyday people. The wreckage of the storefronts
in Seattle mimics the many acts of destruction around the globe by people in those
rebellions known as “IMF riots.” If liberals want to run away from these acts of vio-
lence, the doyens of the right recognize that they are not random, but the necessary
response of everyday people to the extension of the global capitalist market. The
notorious F. A. Hayek warned that the market approach would produce discontent
and lead to “acts of desperation on the part of the needy.”11 As Ronald Reagan and
Margaret Thatcher looked out at the decade of the 1980s to regulate the world in
Hayek’s image (without his own foreboding), the Brandt Report on the IMF noted,
“The Fund’s insistence on drastic measures has tended to impose unnecessary and
unacceptable political burdens on the poorest, on occasion leading to ‘IMF riots’ and
even [the] downfall of governments.” And the president of the World Bank and for-
mer head of the Bank of America Tom Clausen argued, “When people are desper-
ate, you have revolutions. It’s in our own evident self-interest to see that they are not
forced into that. You must keep the patient alive, because otherwise you can’t effect
the cure.”12 Capitalist globalization (whose current stabilization techniques are
encapsulated in IMFundamentalism) produces discontent that, in turn, is the mulch
that generates the violence from below. To be indignant about that violence is to for-
get the social conditions that generate it and the institutionalized powerlessness of
the people who turn to such forms of rebellion.
As the left abjured and denounced acts of terror, the representatives of the
bourgeoisie tarred it with that liability. For one, there is the tendency to read the
exuberant texts (with words like smash and violence) as terrorist documents. To dis-
credit the left, power sought to portray it as a disease whose main vector was random
violence. If the left did not act by the playbook of violence, power sent its provoca-
teurs to create havoc in the ranks of the studied opposition. The U.S. left, as many
have catalogued, was devastated by this tactic developed to an art in COINTELPRO
(Counter-Intelligence Program). Furthermore, power uses the notion of terrorism to
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ferret out all manner of rebels whose opposition inflicts political pain on the regime,
just as it calls its own militant partisans freedom fighters. The act of definition to
dismiss the work of the opposition is one well cultivated by the U.S. government, cre-
ating a vague definition of terrorism (in US Code Title 22, section 265.d, 1983, as
“premeditated, politically motivated, violence perpetrated against non-combatant
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an
audience”) so that it may exculpate its contra allies (secretary of state George Schultz
told Congress in 1986 that “once we understand terrorism’s goals and methods it is
not hard to tell, as we look around the world, who are the terrorists and who the free-
dom fighters. The Contras in Nicaragua, for example, do not blow up school buses or
hold mass execution of civilians”).13 In 1918, as one example, Lord Willingdon, the
governor of Bombay province, said of Gandhi that he is “Honest, but a Bolshevik and
for that reason very dangerous.”14 If power is allowed the latitude to define what is or
what is not terrorism, the left has already been put on the road to defeat.
Recently, the U.S. government pronounced the Colombian group Revolu-
tionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de Colombia,
FARC) a terrorist organization, and there is a sense that Maoist armed rebellion
itself constitutes a form of terrorism. To leave the context out of Maoist movements
and to occlude the inner-Maoist dialogues about violence serves as a convenient way
to dismiss all manner of movements opposing power. Maoism, as a political strategy,
is about a people’s war, where zones liberated by the partisans of the left fight a con-
ventional war (or guerrilla war) against the military. To call groups as diverse as the
Colombian FARC, the Maoists in Nepal and India, and the Peruvian Sendero Lumi-
noso and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) all terrorists is to
miss the ruthless criticism amongst these Maoists of the violence of others. For
instance, during the MRTA’s capture of the Japanese embassy in Lima, Peru, its
leader Nestor Cerpa Cartolini issued a communiqué (no. 3, December 28, 1996) that
said, “We don’t accept that we continue being compared with Shining Path, an
organization that we have repeatedly condemned for the use of irrational violence
that affects the people itself,” whereas the MRTA operates “within a strict framework
of respect for the civil population.”15 Mao, in 1929, strongly disputed “the ideology of
roving rebel bands” and its concomitant, “the remnants of putschism.”16 Just short of
a decade later, Mao explained to his troops that the slogan “Political Power Grows
Out of the Barrel of a Gun” did not mean that the gun was the means to power, but
that “the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command
the Party.”17 Mao, unlike many Maoists today, did not make a fetish of the gun or of
the armed struggle. The context of China after the Shanghai massacre of 1928 and
into the Yenan years (1937–46) made the gun a necessity, both in the struggle
against the armed warlord nationalists and the Japanese imperialists. In 1934 Mao
distinguished between terrorism (war against the people) and a “revolutionary war,”
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“a war of the masses; it can be waged only by mobilizing the masses and relying on
them.”18 Even here, even as we may say that violence in all situations is harmful, it
cannot be denied that Maoism at its best is far from terrorism and close to the armed
struggle for national liberation familiar to any student of the American Revolution.
Only in jail did Bhagat Singh read widely (especially from Marx and Lenin,
on the history of the Russian Revolution, and Upton Sinclair, whom he especially
loved), reflect in a manner far beyond his youth, and revise many of his theses on
political strategy. His letter to his political comrades written on February 2, 1931,
comprises a mature analysis of the limitations of the Congress Party and of Gandhi,
since both seemed prone to avoid the will of the working class and the peasantry,
even as Gandhi fashioned himself the great mobilizer of the peasants. In that letter,
Bhagat Singh wrote, “Apparently I have acted like a terrorist. But I am not a terror-
ist. I am a revolutionary who has got such definite ideas of a lengthy programme as
is being discussed here.” Again, 
Let me announce with all the strength at my command, that I am not a terrorist
and I never was, expect perhaps in the beginning of my revolutionary career.
And I am convinced that we cannot gain anything through those methods. One
can easily judge it from the history of the Hindustan Socialist Republican
Association. All our activities were directed towards an aim, i.e., identifying
ourselves with the great movement as its military wing. If anybody has
misunderstood me, let him amend his ideas. I do not mean that bombs and
pistols are useless, rather the contrary. But I mean to say that mere bomb
throwing is not only useless but sometimes harmful. The military department of
the party should always keep ready all the war-material it can command for any
emergency.19
Already by October 1930, Bhagat Singh, now only twenty-three years old,
had worked out that his earlier phase of “romantic idealism” was politically and
morally indefensible. In a fabulous essay entitled “Why I Am an Atheist,” Bhagat
Singh wrote, “Study was the cry that reverberated in the corridors of my mind. Study
to enable yourself to face the arguments advanced by the opposition. Study to arm
yourself with arguments in favour of your cult. I began to study. My previous faith
and convictions underwent a remarkable modification. The Romance of the violent
methods alone which was so prominent amongst our predecessors was replaced by
serious ideas. No more mysticism, no more blind faith. Realism became our cult.”
Then, Bhagat Singh offers his precise formula for political tactics in the modern
world: “Use of force justifiable when resorted to as a matter of terrible necessity.
Non-violence as policy indispensable for all mass movements.”20
For Bhagat Singh, just as he waited in line to climb the gallows, acts of terror
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against the population were not only morally indefensible, but they were also polit-
ically juvenile. Nothing can be gained from acts of ruthless terror. Terrorism is an
elitist form of politics because it does not demand contact with the masses and it
assumes that the people will rise spontaneously after acts of terror. If freedom
fighters or the oppressed take to the gun, it is in times of terrible necessity, only to
protect the people from a ruthless state and to overthrow state power, not to use vio-
lence to mobilize people. Powerlessness can also grow from the barrel of a gun.
Notes
Lisa Armstrong, Brinda Karat, Mir Ali Raza, and Usha Zacharias offered robust criticisms of an
early draft. Van Gosse must be crazy to have asked me to contribute.
1. I’m stealing the phrase clash of fundamentalisms from the title of Tariq Ali’s wonderful
account, The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihad, Modernity (London: Verso,
2002). The phrase McJihad does a lot of analytical work in my account of 9/11: War against
the Planet: The Fifth Afghan War, Imperialism, and other Assorted Fundamentalisms (New
Delhi: LeftWord, 2002).
2. The important texts by Bhagat Singh and the HRSA are collected in Selected Writings of
Shaheed Bhagat Singh, ed. Shiv Varma (Kanpur: Samajwadi Sahitya Sadan, 1996).
3. Quoted in Sumit Sarkar, Modern India, 1885–1947 (New York: St. Martin’s, 1989), 148–49.
4. Shiv Verma, “Introduction,” Selected Writings of Bhagat Singh, 39.
5. G. Adhikari, ed., Documents in the History of the Communist Party of India, vol. 2 (New
Delhi: People’s Publishing House), 443.
6. Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, trans. Samuel Moore and Edward
Averling (New York: International, 1976), 751. 
7. This history is available in Tariq Ali, The Clash of Fundamentalisms and in the third chapter
of my War against the Planet, entitled “Tolerance of Arabia.”
8. Like others, I thought Kautsky’s first name was Renegade for many years!
9. I have collapsed the terms of the debate between Ralph Miliband and Nicos Poulantzas,
since I find that they have more in common than their disagreement allowed. Poulantzas’s
early formulation of the problem of class power is best captured in the phrase “Political
power is thus apparently founded on an unstable equilibrium of compromise.” Political
Power and Social Classes (London: New Left, 1973), 192.
10. V. I. Lenin, The State and Revolution (Peking: Foreign Languages, 1976), 59. Emphasis in
original. I recommend for study as well the section entitled “Controversy with the
Anarchists,” wherein Lenin notes the distinction between the socialists and the anarchists
(75).
11. F. A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (London: Routledge, 1960), 285.
12. Willy Brandt, North-South: A Programme for Survival [the Brandt Report] (Cambridge:
MIT Press, 1980), 216; and Sunday Times [UK], November 23, 1980. 
13. Arnab Goswami, Combating Terrorism: The Legal Challenge (Delhi: Har-Anand, 2002).
14. Sarkar, Modern India, 177.
15. E-mail dispatches from the Burn Archive, University of California-San Diego, 1996.
16. Mao Tse-tung, “On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party,” Selected Works, vol. 1 (Peking:
Foreign Languages, 1965), 114. 
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18. Mao Tse-tung, “Be Concerned with the Well-Being of the Masses, Pay Attention to Methods
of Work,” Selected Works, vol. 1, 147.
19. Bhagat Singh, “Why I am an Atheist,” Selected Writings of Bhagat Singh, 123.
20. Che Guevara, decades later, came to the same conclusion: “Terrorism is a measure that is
generally ineffective and indiscriminate in its effect, since it often makes victims of innocent
people and destroys a large number of lives that would be valuable to the revolution.
Besides it hinders all the more or less legal or semi-clandestine contact with the masses and
makes impossible unification for actions that will be necessary at a critical moment.” Che
Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, trans. J. P. Morray (New York: Vantage Books, 1961), chap. 1.
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